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LEHMAN V. SPENCER LADD'S, INC.

The changes time has worked since 1791 in the means for invading
human privacy have truly been phenomenal. We worry now not so
much about the State coming in and seizing our personal possessions,
as we do about the State overhearing our every word and overseeing
our marital relationships. The privacy principle existed in 1791, but
was not viable, or perhaps not as needed. Today it is. Consequently,
the Court has given the principle a "wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth." Regardless of the theory used, there is little
doubt that in the cases to come, that "sizable hunk of liberty" which
is the right of privacy will find protection in the Constitution. Whether
by specific guarantee, "ordered liberty", or "penumbra", the weapons
for combating the invasion are there. Surely, a generation which has
manifested such enormous scientific and sociological advances deserves
at least this much liberty.

Evidence Of Financial Worth And Apportionment
Of Exemplary Damages
Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc.'
Plaintiff brought an action against two joint tort-feasors, alleging
wrongful eviction from its place of business and conversion of its
property. By its complaint, plaintiff sought both compensatory and
exemplary damages.2 During the trial, the court permitted plaintiff,
without objection by the defendants, to introduce evidence of the financial worth of each defendant in support of its claim for exemplary
damages. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, against both defendants, and rendered a joint and several verdict in the amount of
$11,952.00 compensatory damages, and $17,500.00 exemplary damages.
Upon defendants' motion for a new trial, the trial court alternatively
ordered plaintiff to file a remittitur of that portion of the verdict which
assessed exemplary damages or suffer a new trial. Plaintiff refused to
file the remittitur and appealed the trial court's order to the First
District Court of Appeal,' which reversed the remittitur order, holding
that evidence of the financial worth of one or more joint defendants
was admissible as bearing upon the issue of exemplary damages in an
action against joint tort-feasors wherein both compensatory and exemplary damages were alleged.
1. 182 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1965).
2. Damages which have been awarded over-and-above compensatory damages
have been labeled "smart-money," "punitive" damages, "vindictive" damages, and
"exemplary" damages; they will be referred to as exemplary damages throughout
this note.
3. Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731 (Fla. App. 1964) ; 19 ARK.
L. Rxv. 189 (1965).
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In Kellenberger v. Widener,4 the Second District Court of Appeal
of Florida had held that evidence of the financial worth of joint tortfeasors was incompetent as bearing upon the issue of exemplary damages. 5 Due to the conflict of decisions in the districts, the Supreme
Court of Florida granted certiorari for the principal case, and affirmed
the decision rendered by the First District Court of Appeal.6 The court,
however, was cognizant of the inequities that would result by the adoption of either the Kellenberger rule or the rule as enunciated in the
First District. If the Kellenberger rule were adopted, the jury would
be required to rely solely upon conjecture and speculation in determining the amount of exemplary damages that should be awarded. Exemplary damages were awarded in Florida "by way of punishment or
example as a deterrent to others inclined to commit similar wrongs;"'
and the amount of exemplary damages to be awarded lay entirely within the discretion of the jury.' By being deprived of evidence of the
financial worth of each defendant, the jury would consequently be
unable to assess suitable mulcts since "an amount that would operate
as a proper punishment to one man might be inadequate to that effect
upon another by reason of their difference in pecuniary condition." 9
If the rule of the First District were to become law in Florida, a jurisdiction in which there was no right to contribution among joint tortfeasors and in which verdicts against joint defendants were normally
joint and several in character,'" evidence of the financial worth of one
or more joint defendants upon the issue of exemplary damages might
result in a verdict based upon the financial condition of the most
wealthy defendant, which could be executed against any of the less
pecunious defendants. Attempting to rectify this dilemma, the Supreme
Court held that:
[I]n all cases tried after the effective date of this opinion, and in
which the element of punitive damages is an issue for determination, a special or separate verdict shall be used for the assessment
of punitive damages against each tort-feasor. Verdicts for compensatory damages shall continue . . . to be joint and several."

This procedure, in effect, would permit the plaintiff to introduce
evidence of the financial worth of each defendant, and would allow the
4. 159 So. 2d 267 (Fla. App. 1963).
5. The Court decided that where both compensatory and exemplary damages
were alleged in an action ex delicto, interrogatories inquiring as to the financial worth
of one joint defendant were improper.
6. Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc., 182 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1965).
7. Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731, 737.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. By the common law of Florida, verdicts rendered by the jury were customarily general in character and were enforceable against all defendants jointly and
severally for the full amount of damages awarded. Although the trial court, upon the
request of either party, or sua sponte, had the right to request the jury to render a
special verdict separating and apportioning the amount of exemplary damages between
joint defendants, the jury was not required, as a matter of law, to render a special
verdict if it elected not to do so. See Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d
731, 735-36.
11. Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc., 182 So. 2d 402, 403-04 (Fla. 1965).
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jury to award exemplary damages in an amount based upon each defendant's culpability; at the same time the damages would serve as an
adequate individual punishment and effective deterrent. However, the
solution of the dilemma did not resolve the entire problem. As compensatory damages remained jointly and severally assessable against
each defendant, who, in turn, had no right to contribution, one defendant
would always be compelled to pay the full amount of compensatory
damages in addition to his apportioned amount of exemplary damages.
Although the decision by the Florida Supreme Court fell somewhat short of total justice, it represented the most recent attempt by
a state or a federal court to rectify an area of law that is as confused
as it is unjust. It is an area of law marked by rigid adhesion to technical
common law principles which have no proper place among today's
liberal rules governing practice and procedure - rules which strive
for the application of justice rather than stagnant formality. Thus, to
fully evaluate the decision in the principal case it will be necessary to
examine the three inter-related areas of law which have given rise to
the posed dilemma:
(1)

the purposes of exemplary damages;

(2)

the apportionment of exemplary damages; and

(3)

the admissibility of evidence of the financial worth of one or
more joint defendants upon the issue of exemplary damages
in an action in which both compensatory and exemplary damages are alleged.

THE PURPOSES OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

Compensatory damages seek to "recompense [the plaintiff] for his
injuries - just enough to restore him to his former position, a sum
only to make him whole."'" As such, their focus is on the injured
plaintiff, and they serve a reparatory function in the law of torts. 8
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are damages awarded to
the plaintiff in excess of the amount required to compensate for the
injury or loss he has sustained. 4 Although various states have presented divergent and sometimes conflicting theories for the allowance
of exemplary damages, the majority of states' 5 permit a plaintiff to
recover exemplary damages whenever a defendant has acted maliciously,
wantonly or with an evil state of mind.'
Some jurisdictions award
12. Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E. 443, 447 (1927).
13. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. Rev. 1173 (1931).
14. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534, 553 (1899).
15. Four states by judicial decision have completely rejected the allowance of
exemplary damages. See Vincent v. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R., 140 La. 1027, 74 So.
541 (1917) ; Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. 1, 5 (1891) ;
Boyer v. Boir, 8 Neb. 68 (1878) ; Spokane Truck and Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45,
25 Pac. 1072 (1891).
16. See, e.g., Dennis. v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948)
Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89, 100-01 (1883) : "In all cases of personal wrongs . . . if
the injury has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly . . . the jury are not restricted
to . . . compensatory damages, but may give in addition thereto, such . . . punitive
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exemplary damages solely for the purpose of compensating the plaintiff; 1 7 but in the overwhelming majority of states their justification
rests upon their being assessed by way of punishing the defendant for
his offense'" and deterring others from similar wrongdoing."
By imposing a monetary penalty by way of exemplary damages in
tort cases, where corresponding criminal processes are often either unavailable or uncalled upon, society has provided for the punishment
of defendants based upon their degree of culpability, 20 and, in most
cases, their financial worth. 2 ' This pecuniary mulct also has the deterrent effect of "protect[ing] every man, woman and child from those
who [would] consciously disregard the rights of their fellows." 2 By
deterring wrongful conduct, the number of law suits is reduced, and
the over-burdening of the judicial machinery is somewhat mitigated.
Thus, the state is interested in the assessment of exemplary damages
to an even greater extent than the injured party. Consequently, while
compensatory damages focus mainly upon the condition of the plaintiff,
exemplary damages relate more to the situation of the wrongdoer and
provide for the almost "unlimited individualization of the treatment
of defendants. The only limitations ... [are] that the burden of the defendant's admonition be confined to a monetary judgment and the jury's
determination [be] subject to the veto of the trial and appellate

judges."2 3

damages as the case will warrant." In Dennis, supra at 817, malice was defined to
signify that the "defendant was influenced by hatred and spite and . . . indulged in
deliberate and willful mischief to injure the plaintiff." Wanton was held to be
"characterized by extreme recklessness and utter disregard for the rights of others."

See also

CALIF. CIVIL CODE ANN.

§ 3294 (1954):

In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied,
the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the
sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
Georgia, Montana, and Oklahoma have similar statutes. See GA. CoDE ANN. § 1052002 (1937) ; MONT.R.V. CODE ANN. § 17-208 (1947) ; OKLA.STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1951).
17. See Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 At. 692, 692-93 (1930), where
the court said that the purpose of exemplary damages is "not to punish the defendant
for his offense but to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries and so-called punitive
or exemplary damages cannot exceed the amount of the plaintiff's expenses of litigation less taxable costs." In Georgia, Michigan, and New Hampshire, exemplary damages are given to compensate the plaintiff for wounded feelings and injured dignity.
See Rattaree v. Chapman, 79 Ga. 574, 4 S.E. 684 (1887) ; Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich.
229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922) ; Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873).
18. See, -e.g., Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731 (Fla. App. 1964);
Ashland Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 302 Ky. 577, 195 S.W.2d 312 (1946); Dennis v.
Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 616, 56 A.2d 813, 816 (1948) ("[I]n this State...
if an injury has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, the jury . . .may award . . .
punitive damages . . . as a punishment for the wrong done and as an example to
others.") ; Shuler v. Heitley, 209 S.C. 198, 39 S.E.2d 360 (1946), aff'd, 213 S.C. 225,
48 S.E.2d 801 (1948).
19. See, e.g., Motor Equipment Co. v. McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258, 133 P.2d 149,
159 (1943) ; Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948) ; Main
v. Levine, 189 Okla. 564, 118 P.2d 252, 255 (1941).
20. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512, 520 (1933):
Eixemplary damages, which under the [North Dakota] statute are awarded. ...
for example, by way of punishment, may be allowed in different amounts, depending
upon the degree of culpability among the several wrongdoers."; Johnson v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E. 443, 453 (1927) ; Woodhouse v. Woodhouse,
99 Vt. 91, 130 Atl. 758, 781 (1925).
21. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
22. Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E. 443, 447 (1927).
23. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. Rev. 1173, 1189 (1931).
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OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

In 1584, Sir John Heydon's Case24 established the rule that in an
action of trespass vi et armis against joint tort-feasors, the jury could
not separate and apportion damages based upon the different degrees
of culpability of the several wrongdoers.2 5 However, this case, which
became the leading authority for denying apportionment of exemplary
damages in England and the United States, was decided almost two
centuries prior to the first known case 26 in which the doctrine of
exemplary damages was explicitly established. Whether Sir John
Heydon's Case was one in which exemplary damages could have been
appropriately awarded is speculative due to its compendious report.
The English court, however, awarded damages based upon the rule
of compensatory damages, namely, that since all defendants were alleged
to have committed a single wrong against the plaintiff, they were
deemed equally guilty; therefore, they were all equally liable, and the
jury could not apportion the verdict among them.2 ' But, despite the
basis of the award, Sir John Heydon's Case became the foundation for
the doctrine of joint and several liability of joint tort-feasors for exemplary damages - a doctrine that became entrenched in the common law
of England, 8 and was carried over into the early American cases.20
As a result, many states have held that if a plaintiff joins in a
single action two or more defendants, some of whom acted without
improper motives and were liable for compensatory damages only, and
some of whom acted maliciously and were liable for exemplary damages as well, plaintiff was entitled to damages based solely upon the
culpability of the most innocent defendant,3" since "only such damages
24. 11 Coke 6, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1584).
25. The court held that "[W]hen in trespass against diverse defendants they
plead not guilty on several pleas, and the jury find for the plaintiff in all, the jurors
can not assess several damages against the defendants, because all is one trespass,
and made joint by the plaintiff . . . and although one of them is more malicious . . .
yet all coming to do unlawful act, and of one party, the act of one is the act of all ..
Id. at 1151.
26. Huckle v. Money, 2 Wills K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (1763) ("[The
defendant] heard the King's Counsel, and saw the solicitor of the Treasury endeavoring to support and maintain the legality of the warrant in a tyrannical and severe
manner. These [were] the ideas which struck the jury on the trial; and I think they
have done right in giving exemplary damages. To enter a man's home by virtue of a
nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition . . .") ; Grey v. Grant, 2 Wills K.B. 253, 95 Eng. Rep. 794 (1764).

27. See Cobb v. Heydon, 12 Jac. 1, 79 Eng. Rep. 298 (1606) ("Trespass of
battery . . . [All] issues were found for the plaintiff, and several damages found
against [the defendants], who pleaded severally. - And ruled to be ill: for it is one
joint and entire offence by the plaintiff's action; and when all are found . . . equally
guilty, the damages ought to have been entire.") ; Austen v. Willward, 5 Burr. 2791,
78 Eng. Rep. 1086 (1601).
28. See Greenlands, Ltd. v. Wilmshurst, [1913] 3 K.B. 507, 530, 561. See also
Clark v. Newsam, 1 Exch. 131, 154 Eng. Rep. 55 (1847).
29. See, e.g., Halsey v. Woodruff, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 555 (1830); Crawford v.
Morris, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 350, 354 (1848). Contra., White v. M'Neily, 1 S.C. (1 Bay)
11, 12 (1784) ("[U]pon mature consideration . . . [the power was given] the jury,
to apportion . . . the quantum of damages, agreeable to the degree of guilt of each
trespasser.")
30. Weir v. McEwan, 94 N.J.L. 92, 109 Atd. 355 (1920); Gill v. Selling, 125
Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812 (1928) ; McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881); 2 SUTHERLA D, DAMACG.S

(4th Ed.) p. 3407.
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for which [the defendants were] jointly liable [could] be recovered
from joint tort-feasors by a joint verdict."'" Because the verdict in
these jurisdictions was enforceable by the plaintiff jointly and severally,
he had the option of executing the entire judgment against any single
defendant. The defendant who was compelled to pay had no recourse
against the others; there was no right to contribution among joint
tort-feasors at common law. 2 Thus, even though the plaintiff was
fully compensated for his injury or loss, exemplary damages were
eliminated from the verdict since at least one defendant was free from
improper motives. Those defendants who would normally be liable
for exemplary damages, if sued individually, escaped punishment. 3
The possible deterrent effect of exemplary damages was thereby lost.
Several theories have been advanced to rationalize this resuit. An
early Massachusetts case 34 justified denying apportionment upon the
theory that "the sole inquiry open to [the jury] is, what damages the
plaintiff has sustained, not who ought to pay them. ' 3 But this merely
states the rule in different words. Other courts have held that when
a plaintiff has joined several tort-feasors, he has thereby "waived" his
claims to exemplary damages that may have been available had he sued
the defendants individually. 6 One author has concluded that the jury
in this type of case should be precluded from apportioning damages,
because there will be fewer issues for it to decide and less opportunity
to disagree.3 T But today, with the advent of modern liberal procedural
rules governing special verdicts,' this can no longer be a valid justification. Most courts, however, simply adopted the rule of joint and several
liability as settled law without attempting to explain or justify it.39
In multiple defendant cases where joint tort-feasors were all liable
for exemplary damages, but in different amounts, due to different degrees of culpability, the situation was somewhat more complex, and
the verdict usually more inequitable. One court has held that the jury
was compelled to render a verdict for joint and several damages in the
amount which, in their judgment, the most culpable of the defendants
ought to pay." This resulted in the over-punishment of all defendants
unless the plaintiff chose to levy execution against the most culpable;
31. Weir v. McEwan, supra note 30, at 356.
32. Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
33. In order to escape the full effect of this harsh and unjust rule, the practice
developed whereby if the jury had rendered several verdicts against each joint tortfeasor for the full amount of compensatory damages, and, in addition, a sum by way oi
exemplary damages based upon each defendant's degree of culpability, before the
judgment was entered, the plaintiff could elect the defendant against whom he wished
to execute the judgment, and would enter a nolle prosequi or remittitur as to the
others. See Layman v. Hendrix, 1 Ala. 212 (1840) ; Halsey v. Woodruff, 26 Mass.
(9 Pick.) 555 (1830) ; Clissold v. Mochell, 26 U.C.Q.B. 422 (Canada 1886).
34. Halsey v. Woodruff, supra note 33.
35. Id. at 556.
36. See Dunaway v. Troutt, 232 Ark. 615, 339 S.W.2d 613 (1960) ; Gill v. Selling
125 Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812 (1928) ; Davis v. Traake, 33 Gratt. 413 (Va. 1880).
37. Note, 26 MICH. L. REv. 795, 798 (1927).
38. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 49; MD.R. Civ. P. 560.
39. E.g., Nordhaus v. Vandalia R. Co., 242 Ill.
166, 89 N.E. 974 (1909) ; McAllister v. Kimberly Clark, 169 Wis. 473, 173 N.W. 216 (1919).
40. Bell v. Morrison, 27 Miss. 68, 86 (1854).
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and if the execution could be levied against only one defendant, all other
defendants, escaped any form of punishment. The majority of states,
however, which refused to apportion exemplary damages in this type
of situation, have set the amount of damages at the sum which the
least culpable defendant ought to pay. 4 ' This practice resulted in the
underpunishment of all defendants unless the least culpable was compelled to pay, and when the verdict was extracted from one defendant,
the remaining defendants escaped all punishment whatsoever.
A growing number of states have refused to adopt either of the
above rules and have upheld the severance and apportionment of
exemplary damages in various situations. In actions in which a plaintiff has joined several tort-feasors, only some of whom were liable
for exemplary damages, various jurisdictions have allowed the jury to
render verdicts for compensatory damages against one or more defendants, and exemplary damages against one or more defendants. 42 In
explaining the reasons for the adoption of this practice, the California
Court in Davis v. Hearst,43 stated:
In an action for compensatory damages against joint tort-feasors
But,
... the law will not permit an apportionment of damages ....
under our system of procedure . . . there is nothing . . . to

prevent the award of compensatory damages against all joint tortfeasors who are found culpable, and to add a specific sum or sums,
by way of punitive damages against such of the tort-feasors as
the jury shall find to have been actuated by malice in fact. Not
only is this permissible, but it tends to simplicity and avoids
the multiplicity of actions which otherwise would become necessary. .

.

. There is a scarcity of authority upon this proposition,

but we think the principle as we have enunciated it is sound.
In multiple defendant cases in which all defendants were liable for
exemplary damages, but in different amounts due to different degrees of
culpability, California has built upon the Hearst rule and has held that:
[S]ince exemplary damages are, under the terms of section 3294
of the Civil Code, to be awarded in addition to the actual damages
and as damages 'for the sake of example and by way of punishing
the defendant,' it would seem to be a rule of reason that, where
the defendants, though joint tort-feasors, .

.

. have been guilty

of different degrees of oppression, fraud, or malice so as to justify
a verdict or verdicts for exemplary damages under the abovequoted section of the Code, and where such damages under said
section are to be awarded 'for the sake of example and by way of
punishing' each particular defendant according to the measure of
41. E.g., Gill v. Selling, 125 Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812 (1928); McCarthy v. DeArmit,
99 Pa. 63 (1881) ; Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1, 42 At. 607 (1899) ; Washington Gas
Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534 (1899).
42. Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 Pac. 530 (1911); McCurdy v. Hughes,
63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512 (1933); Maulk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E.
153 (1903).
43. Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 Pac. 530, 542 (1911) ; accord, Nelson v.
Havlorsen, 117 Minn. 255, 135 N.W. 812 (1912).
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his offending, juries should be allowed so to admeasure and apportion such exemplary damages 44as to make the example as well as
the punishment fit the offense.
Other jurisdictions, by statute45 or by judicial decision 46 have adopted

the California rule and have held it proper for the jury to apportion
exemplary damages when all defendants were liable therefor.
By thus allowing the apportionment of exemplary damages, the
above courts seem to be doing nothing more than fulfilling the purposes
for which exemplary damages were created. There remains to be found
a valid justification for the doctrine of joint and several liability of
joint tort-feasors for exemplary damages. On the contrary, it cannot
be doubted that the
• . . policy of allowing separate verdicts is preferable. The rule
of one verdict against all the defendants found guilty will almost
always cause the entire punishment to fall upon one alone. The
other defendants will then be freed and discharged from liability on
the judgment, thus, being enabled, notwithstanding the 'example'
44. Thomas v. Catalina, 205 Cal. 402, 271 Pac. 198, 200 (1928). North Dakota,
which has a statute similar to the one found in the Catalina case, has held that "...
exemplary damages, which under the [North Dakota] statute are awarded . . . for
example, by way of punishment, may be allowed in different amounts, depending upon
the degree of culpability among the several wrongdoers." McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D.
435, 248 N.W. 512, 520 (1933) ; accord, Edquest v. Tripp and Dragstedt Co., 93 Mont.
446, 19 P.2d 637, 640-41 (1933) ("Our statute, § 8666, Revised Codes 1921, provides:
'In any action for a breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of . . . malice . . . the jury . . . may give damages for the

sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.' [Thus, we] hold that the
jury in an action against tort-feasors may make awards for exemplary damages in
different amounts, depending upon what the evidence shows and the jury finds to be
the differing degrees of culpability among the several defendants ....
This imposition
of different amounts of exemplary damages based . . . upon the culpability . . . of the
different defendants avoids . . . injustice ... and gives § 8666 ... force and effect ... ").

45. See, e.g., GA. COD ANN. § 105-2011 (1956) (This statute has been interpreted to permit apportionment of verdicts only in cases of trespass upon property.
Hightower v. Landrum, 109 Ga. App. 510, 136 S.E.2d 425 (1964)); Ky. Rev. STAT.
ANN. § 454.040 (1963).
An interesting example of a state's refusal to depart from the rule of joint and
several liability for exemplary damages can be seen in Illinois. Section 50(1) of the
Civil Practice Act, ILL. Rpv. STAT. ch. 110, § 174(1) (1941) provided that ". . . more
than one judgment or decree may be rendered in the same cause ..
" Section 50(1),
as enacted in 1933, was substantially the same as Nsw JgRsY LAWS p. 377, § 20 (1912)
with the addition of the above quoted sentence. Upon the authority of section 50(1),
an Illinois Appellate Court held that the jury properly apportioned exemplary damages
among joint tort-feasors. Shaw v. Courtney, 317 Ill. App. 422, 46 N.E.2d 170 (1943).
Several years later, an Illinois Appellate Court again had the opportunity to construe
this section. It overruled Shaw and held that ". . . section 50 permit[ted] the use of
separate judgments only when the plaintiff presented separate . . . causes of action
against several defendants . . . and under the common law rule, which has not
been affected by Section 50 . . . the jury may not apportion the damages between joint
tort-feasors." Stoewsand v. Checker Taxi Co., 331 Ill. App. 192, 73 N.E.2d 4, 9-10
(1947). The decision was also based upon that part of Section 50(1) which provided
that ". . . the plaintiff shall receive but one satisfaction." The Stoewsand case, however, was an action solely for compensatory damages, thus factually distinguishable
from Shaw. And the Illinois Legislature has since deleted from Section 50(1) that
portion which provided that ". . . the plaintiff shall receive but one satisfaction." ILL.
STAT. ANN. ch. 110, § 50(1) (1956).
46. E.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hill, 245 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Me. 1965):
Bowman v. Lewis, 110 Mont. 435, 102 P.2d 1 (1940); McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D.
435, 248 N.W. 512 (1933).
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of the verdict 'for the public good,' to wholly evade the penalty and
defeat altogether the ends of justice.4 7
But while the apportionment of exemplary damages per se is more
preferable and equitable than the single verdict, it still does not alleviate
all inequities. Although exemplary damages have been justly apportioned according to the culpabilities of the several defendants, the jury
has no means of foretelling from which defendant the joint and several
liability for compensatory damages will be extracted. To effectively
rectify this situation, it is suggested that the collection of exemplary
damages by a plaintiff be contingent upon a defendant's payment of
no more than his pro ratashare of compensatory damages. If the entire
amount of compensatory damages is extracted from one defendant, the
amount of exemplary damages that has been assessed against him can
be reduced in an amount equal to what would be his proportionate share
of compensatory damages.4" The jury would still retain the power to
determine the amount of exemplary damages that should be awarded
against each defendant, and the plaintiff would be guaranteed compensation for his loss. Several states,49 moreover, have adopted the
Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-Feasors Act which provides
for the pro rata contribution among joint tort-feasors of compensatory
damages. 50
It is submitted that only in those jurisdictions which adopt the
above act and thereby permit the pro rata contribution of compensatory damages and also allow the jury to apportion exemplary
damages based upon the culpability of each of the defendants can total
justice be achieved. 5
The Maryland Court of Appeals has yet to decide a case directly
pertaining to the apportionment of exemplary damages, but there is
reason to believe that apportionment would be contrary to the intent
of the legislature. When Maryland adopted the Uniform Contribution
Among Joint Tort-Feasors Act in 1941, one subsection was entirely
omitted.52 That section provided:
(4) When there is such a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to render inequitable an equal distribution among them
of the common liability by contribution, the relative degrees of
fault of the joint tort-feasors shall be considered in determining
their pro rata shares.5"
47. Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E. 443, 454-55

(1927).

48. Note, 38 VA. L. Riv. 71, 78 (1952).

49. E.g., Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Mexico,
Rhode Island, and South Dakota.
50. 9 U.L.A. 235 (1957) ; MD. CODE ANN. art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1957).
51. No state has been found that follows this practice. Of the states that permit

the jury to apportion exemplary damages, only California, Kentucky, and North Dakota
have statutes providing for the pro rata contribution of compensatory damages among
joint tort-feasors. See CALW. ANN. COD9 CIv. PROC. § 875 (1957); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 412.030 (1963); N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN. § 32-38-01 (1960).
Yet, each
statute expressly disallows this pro rata contribution among joint tort-feasors in cases
of intentional, malicious, or willful conduct on the part of the defendants.
52. LAws OF MARYLAND ch. 344, § 21 (1941).
53. 9 U.L.A. 235 § 2(4) (1957). Other states have also omitted this section. E.g.,
Pennsylvania, New Mexico, and Rhode Island.
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The Commissioner's Note54 indicated that this section was designed to
permit the jury to apportion
damages based upon the culpability of
each joint defendant. 5 The Maryland legislature's failure to adopt this
section may show its disapproval of the doctrine of apportionment of
exemplary damages. However, the intent of the legislature may have
embraced compensatory damages only.
It is urged that the Maryland legislature and judiciary reconsider
this question and permit the jury to apportion exemplary damages.
Lacking clearer legislative intent to the contrary, the Maryland courts
should take the needed action. To follow the common law rule and
deny apportionment may foreclose recovery of any exemplary damages
and, thereby, elevate form over reason and justice. The purposes of
exemplary damages in Maryland are to punish the wrongdoer and
deter others from similar wrongful conduct.56 No logical justification
remains for not furthering these purposes in cases in which the plaintiff
has joined several defendants. It has been stated that:
[T]he common law is the perfection of reason, and, when a rule
of common law ceases to be reasonable and just, it ... [should]

no longer [be] the common law. Those principles of the common
law which are unsuited to our conditions, or are repugnant to the
spirit of our institutions [should not be] in force.5
In no plainer context can the justification for this statement be found
than in the area of law which denies the apportionment of exemplary damages.
EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL WORTH

It has been generally recognized that in actions against a single
defendant in which exemplary damages have been alleged, evidence of
his financial worth is admissible.58 This is due to the purpose of
exemplary damages - to properly punish the defendant for his wrongdoing.59 Thus, in order for the jury to inflict a proper punishment,
that is, "a sum of money which, according to [the defendant's] financial
54. 9 U.L.A. 235, 236 (1957).

("This subsection . . . will . . . permit apportion-

ment of pro rata shares of liability of the joint tort-feasors as among themselves....
The draftsmen of the Act feel that there is a very strong case to be made for apportioning the common liability as among the tort-feasors when the evidence clearly
indicates that one or more of the tort-feasors was much more at fault than one or
more of the others ... ").
55. An Arkansas Court, relying upon this section in an action for assault against
joint tort-feasors, in which the jury were given instructions upon the issue of exemplary
damages, held that the jury had the power to apportion damages. Schultz v. Young,
205 Ark. 533, 169 S.W.2d 648 (1943). However, the legislature subsequently amended
the section by adding: "solely for the purpose of determining their rights of contribution among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the injured persons for tile
whole injury as at common law." ARK. SrAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 1002 (1962).
56. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
57. Interstate Co. v. Garnett, 154 Miss. 325, 122 So. 373, 378 (1929).
58. See, e.g., Smith v. Wunderlich, 70 Ill. 426 (1873) ; Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md.
89 (1883); Johnson v. Horn, 86 Mont. 314, 283 Pac. 427 (1929) ; Annot., 123 A.L.R.

1115, 1136 (1939) ; Annot., 16 A.L.R. 771, 838 (1922).
59. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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ability, will hurt, but not bankrupt,""0 the pecuniary standing of the
defendant is of first import; for "a verdict that would be scarcely
regarded by a wealthy man, might be ruinous to a poor man.''61
Yet, in the realm of joint defendant cases, the majority of courts
do not permit a plaintiff to introduce evidence of the financial worth
of any of the defendants. 2 The leading case of Washington Gas Light
Co. v. Lansden has compendiously stated the majority rule:
While all defendants joined are liable for compensatory damages,
there is no justice in allowing the recovery of punitive damages,
in an action against several defendants, based upon evidence of
the wealth and ability to pay such damages on the part of one of
the defendants only. As the verdict must be for one sum against
all defendants who are guilty, it seems to be plain that when a
plaintiff voluntarily joins several parties as defendants, he must
be held to thereby waive any right to recover punitive damages
against all, founded upon evidence of the ability of one of the
several defendants to pay them. This rule does not prevent the
recovery of punitive damages in all cases where several defendants
63
are joined. What the rule is in such case is not, perhaps, certain.
The foundation for the majority rule has been built upon a jurisdiction's
refusal to apportion exemplary damages. 64 Since the verdict in these
jurisdictions must be joint and several, it is conceded that it would be
manifestly unjust for a plaintiff to have the option to levy execution
against any defendant when the amount of the exemplary damages
included in the verdict was set at an amount which would operate as
a punishment for a wealthier co-defendant. Yet upon what standard is
the jury left to determine the adequacy of their punishment in the majority of jurisdictions in which all defendants are liable for the entire sum of
exemplary damages which are assessed in an amount based upon the
culpability of the most innocent defendant liable for exemplary damages?
Suppose the following situation in a jurisdiction that has adopted
the majority rule: A, B, and C have all combined to maliciously injure
the plaintiff. A is a well-known wealthy corporation; B appears to be
60. Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc., 182 So. 2d 402, 404 (Fla. 1965).
61. Bell v. Morrison, 27 Miss. 68, 86 (1854).
62. E.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534 (1899); Dunaway
v. Troutt, 339 S.W.2d 613 (Ark. 1960) ; Smith v. Wunderlich, 70 Ill. 426 (1873);
Leavell v. Leavell, 114 Mo. App. 24, 89 S.W. 55 (1905) ; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Bryant,
105 Va. 403, 54 S.E. 320 (1906); Cramer v. Cramer, 106 Wash. 681, 180 Pac. 915
(1919).
63. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534, 553 (1889).
64. Courts following this rule theorize that although the evidence is inadmissible,
a plaintiff is not unduly prejudiced by this rule, since "he has the election of discontinuing or dismissing his action against the impecunious defendants and proceeding
to judgment only against the defendant of considerable means, thereby rendering
admissible evidence of financial worth against the defendant best able to pay." Spencer
Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731, 737 (Fla. App. 1964). But under the Maryland
Rules of Procedure, it is doubtful whether the plaintiff would have this opportunity.
Once evidence of financial worth has been introduced at the trial, this defendant would
not be likely to consent to a dismissal. MD.R. Civ. P. 541a (1, 2). And, as a voluntary
dismissal will be allowed by the Court "only... upon such terms and conditions as the
Court deems proper," it is clear that a plaintiff is not completely free to dismiss or
discontinue his action against the less wealthy defendants. MD. R. Civ. P. 541b.
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an individual of average means; C is obviously an individual with little
financial resources. If A is established to be the least malicious of the
defendants, should the jury award exemplary damages in an amount
which they feel would serve as a proper mulct against A, when the
judgment could also be executed against B and C? For even where
"evidence concerning the wealth of the defendant is not given ....

we

know that juries consider such matters when they know the facts ...""
If C should be adjudged the least culpable defendant, would it be just
for the jury to set exemplary damages at a negligible amount, when,
if they were levied against A or B, they would neither serve as a proper
punishment nor adequate deterrent? Or, suppose B was held to be the
least culpable defendant, and the jury assessed exemplary damages at an
amount which would serve as an adequate punishment for a defendant
of average wealth, these damages, if collected from A, would obviously
not be a suitable punishment. Yet, if they were levied against C, they
would turn out to be ruinous."'
Surely, this was the uncertainty with which the Supreme Court
was faced, but left unresolved in the Washington Gas Light case. And
surely, this is the uncertainty that faces every jurisdiction, which, as
a result of refusing to apportion exemplary damages, does not allow a
plaintiff to introduce evidence of the financial worth of joint defendants.
The jury has thus been left to conjecture, and justice in no case can
be rendered.
A minority of courts,6 7 however, have permitted a plaintiff to
introduce evidence of the financial worth of joint defendants as bearing
upon the issue of exemplary damages. These courts are all found in
jurisdictions which allow the apportionment of exemplary damages.6"
Only three states have permitted such evidence when exemplary damages, at the same time, were held to be non-apportionable.6 9 The obvious
65. See Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E. 443, 454

(1927).

66. Assuming that the amount of exemplary damages is set at any of the three
amounts hypothesized, if, after the verdict has been rendered, it is objected to by either
party on the ground that it is excessive or inadequate, the trial judge has no standard
to use in deciding whether to affirm or set aside the verdict. Furthermore, if the
verdict is set aside, and a new trial is awarded, the appellate court upon review of the
trial court's decision will have no record upon which to determine whether the lower
court abused its discretion.
67. E.g., Nelson v. Havlorsen, 117 Minn. 255, 135 N.W. 818 (1912) ; Edquest v.
Tripp & Dragstedt Co., 93 Mont. 446, 19 P.2d 637 (1933); Oskamp v. Oskamp, 20
Ohio App. 349, 152 N.E. 208 (1925) ; Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 142 S.C.
125, 140 S.E. 443 (1927) ; Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 Pac. 55 (1925).
68. See notes 43-48 supra and accompanying text.
69. Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731 (Fla. App. 1964) ; Bell v.
Morrison, 27 Miss. 68 (1854); Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 99 Vt. 91, 130 Ati. 758
(1925). The rule of Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, has since been changed by the
decision of the principal case. Bell v. Morrison, held that evidence of the financial
worth of joint defendants was admissible in an action in which the verdict was to be
rendered jointly in an amount which the most culpable defendant ought to pay. But
the court's reasoning was faulty. It first allowed evidence of the defendants' financial
worth to be introduced in order that the jury could assess proper individual punishments; but then held that the joint verdict should be set at an amount based upon the
culpability of the most malicious defendant. Since the damages which would operate
as a proper punishment against the most culpable defendant might have been an
exorbitant mulct to a less pecunious defendant against whom the judgment could be
extended, the court defeated its own purpose for holding the evidence of financial worth
admissible. The Vermont court in Woodhouse, at 779, held that evidence of financial
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hardship of the latter rule upon impecunious defendants has been
justified on several grounds. The Florida appellate court theorized
that since it was the
wanton, willful and malicious acts of . . . the defendants which
[brought] the rule into operation . . . they should not be
granted partial immunity from the consequences of their acts by
a rule excluding evidence of their financial worth at the expense
of an innocent and injured plaintiff.7"
Mississippi, on the other hand, permits such evidence: "[O]therwise a
wealthy defendant, who was principally implicated in a wrong of this
character, might escape the payment of just and reasonable damages,
by having others, without character or property, associated in the unlawful act."7 " But this hardship is one that should no longer exist.
It can be alleviated by providing for the pro rata distribution of compensatory damages and the apportionment of exemplary damages.
Evidence of the financial worth of each joint defendant will then establish the amounts which would serve as proper punishments.
One factor remains to be considered, that is, the possible prejudicial nature of evidence establishing the financial worth of joint defendants. While this evidence enables the jury to reach a proper and just
verdict upon the issue of exemplary damages, it may also collaterally
affect its decision on liability. It has been noted that "rich men do not
fare well against juries, and the more emphasis [that is] placed on
their riches, the less well they will fare."' 72 To allow the plaintiff to
introduce evidence of the wealth of one or more defendants may well
play an important role in determining the actual outcome of the litigation; "juries may be more interested in divesting vested interests than
in attempting to fix penalties which will make for effective working of
the admonitory function."73 In order to prevent this result, it is suggested that such evidence be withheld until the jury has returned a general verdict; once the issue of liability for exemplary damages has been
established, the issue of the amount of exemplary damages can then be
tried, and evidence of the financial worth of each defendant fairly introduced. Thereby the defendants are not prejudiced by the evidence,
but the purposes of the exemplary damages are fully effectuated.
worth of one joint defendant was admissible, but to be used "only in assessing
exemplary damages in case the verdict should be against him alone." By way of dicta,
the court indicated that in future actions against joint tort-feasors in which all were
liable for exemplary damages, evidence of the financial wealth of the least wealthy
defendant would be admissible. But this practice would result in the underpunishment
of all more wealthy defendants, and, as the verdict would be joint and several, all
defendants but one would escape punishment. The Maryland Court of Appeals has
held that evidence of the financial worth of a partnership and one joint defendant's
share therein was admissible in an action for compensatory and exemplary damages
against a partnership and the two partners individually. Schloss v. Silverman, 172
Md. 632, 192 Atl. 343 (1937). Cited as authority, however, was Sloan v. Edwards, 61
Md. 89 (1883), which allowed such evidence in an action against only a single defendant. This is a good example of the misapplication of precedents in this area.
70. Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731, 738 (Fla. App. 1964).
71. Bell v. Morrison, 27 Miss. 68, 86 (1854).
72. Morris, supra note 23, at 1191.
73. Ibid.
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CONCLUSION

It has become increasingly evident that the law governing the
awards of exemplary damages in joint defendant cases needs a substantial revision. No jurisdiction as of this late date in legal jurisprudence
has offered a completely satisfactory solution.
Once the basic purposes of exemplary damages are established,
it is evident that the doctrine of joint and several liability of joint
tort-feasors for exemplary damages is an anomaly in the law that has
no place in modern concepts of justice. Plaintiffs can be fully compensated for any injury or loss sustained by the award of compensatory
damages. Multiple defendants, however, need no longer be prejudiced
by liability for the full amount of compensatory damages. By providing
for pro rata contribution among joint defendants for compensatory
damages, each defendant will justly recompense a plaintiff in equal
shares for the total damages actually suffered. A joint tort-feasor who
acted wantonly or willfully in injuring the plaintiff, can be adequately
punished by the award of exemplary damages in an amount based upon
his own degree of culpability, and in an amount that will serve as an
adequate individual mulct. As there remains no valid reason for the
denial of apportionment of exemplary damages, there, in turn, can be
no valid reason for precluding a plaintiff from introducing evidence
of the financial wealth of one or more joint tort-feasors in actions in
which both compensatory and exemplary damages are sought.

A Test For Retroactivity In Criminal Cases
Schowgurow v. State'
The defendant, a Buddhist, was convicted of murder in the Circuit
Court for Cecil County, Maryland. Both before and during trial defendant made motions to dismiss on the ground that the grand jury and
the petit jury were selected in derogation of the first and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution of the United States. The defendant
contended that persons of his religion were excluded from both juries
by article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,2 which requires
1. 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
art. 36:
2. MD. DECLARATION op RIGHTs
That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such a manner as he thinks
most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitled to protection in their
religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in his
person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion, or profession, or for his
religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall disturb the good
order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure
others in their natural, civil or religious rights; nor ought any person be compelled

